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 
Abstract— This research addresses the problem of computer 
worms in the modern Internet. A worm is similar to a virus. A 
worm is a self-propagating computer program that is being 
increasingly and widely used to attack the Internet. It is 
considered as a sub-class of a virus because it is also capable of 
spreading from one computer to another.  Worms are also 
computer programs that are capable of replicating copies of 
themselves via network connections.  What makes it different 
however is that unlike a computer virus a computer worm can 
run itself without any human intervention? Because of these two 
qualities of a worm, it is possible that there will be thousands of 
worms in a computer even if only one computer worm is 
transferred.  For instance, the worm may send a copy of itself to 
every person listed in the e-mail address book.  The worm sent 
may then send a copy of itself to every person who is listed in the 
address book of the person who receives the email.  Because this 
may go on ad infinitum worms can not only cause damage to a 
single computer and to other person’s computer but it can only 
affect the functionality of Web servers and network servers to 
the point that they can no longer function efficiently.  One 
example is the .blaster worm. 
 
 
Index Terms— Worm, Hierarchical Model, Internet, Hosts, 
Infection, Protected, Firewall 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This model assumes a tree structure where the internal nodes 
of the tree are firewalls and leaves are servers vulnerable to 
worm attacks. See Figure 1.1. The firewalls are assumed to be 
immune to infections [1, 2]. It is also assumed that we have 
sensors at the vulnerable hosts that can detect an infection and 
report it. All nodes at a particular level of the hierarchy have 
equal number of children. Each level of the hierarchy has a 
certain threshold associated with it. Once the number of 
infection reports amongst a node's (firewall’s) children 
reaches the threshold, the firewall turns on the filter rules 
protecting all of its children, and alerts its parent that the 
sub-tree below it is infected but now protected. This 
escalation of alerts from one level to the next higher level in 
the hierarchy and protection of sub-trees takes place 
successively as the threshold for infections is reached at each 
node. False alerts are handled by the firewalls by associating a 
`Time to Live'(TTL) with the latest alert that they receive. If 
the threshold is reached before the TTL expires the above 
actions are taken. If the TTL expires before the threshold is 
hit, all the alerts/infection reports are discarded and the 
firewalls `back-off' from protecting its children [2, 4]. This is 
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done because any action taken to contain a worm involves a 
cost, and actions undertaken when there is no worm are of no 
use. 
 
Fig.1.1: Hierarchical relationship among firewalls and 
vulnerable hosts in Hierarchical Model 
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
We will derive some of the interesting quantities of the 
hierarchical model of mitigation mathematically. As always, 
the goal of this whole project is to minimize the number of 
infections amongst our participating hosts [4, 7]. 
The first quantity of interest is the probability with which 
infections are minimized. For this to happen, the root node 
should trigger the protection of its children with the minimum 
number of hosts being infected [3, 4]. 
 
Probability to minimize infection For the sake of this 
derivation let us consider that the leaves are at level 0 of the 
tree, the parents of the leaves are at level 1 and so on [23, 24]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a node to protect its children, it should have received τ 
alerts from its children. 
That is the number of infections  
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Similarly, 
P (Some non-leaf node at level 2 to protect to its children) 
 
 
P (Some non-leaf node at level 3 to protect to its children) 
 
 
 
. 
. 
. 
P (some non-leaf node at level (n - 1) to protect to its children) 
 
 
But the only node at level n  1 is the root node. So, the 
above expression gives us the probability that the root will be 
alerted with the minimum number of infections at the leaves. 
Time to alert root The next interesting mathematical result is 
the time it takes to achieve complete protection. That is the 
time it takes to alert the root so that it can trigger protection of 
its children [17, 18]. 
For the sake of this derivation we will consider a small 
sub-tree with just 2 levels. The top level contains the root 
node and the leaves all form a group. Each infected leaf node 
tries to infect all non-infected leaf nodes in its group [8, 9]. 
For each infected/non-infected leaf node pair, the time until 
infection of the non-infected node by the infected one is 
exponentially distributed. By scaling of time, we can take the 
mean of this distribution to be 1.0. It is assumed that all 
infecting processes operate stochastically independently [6, 
12]. 
: Number of infected nodes in a group 
: The threshold for alerts 
: The group size 
Then in state , there are  exponential random 
variables in progress at once, since each of the  infected 
nodes is trying to infect each of the g i uninfected nodes. 
Then the time to go from state  to  will be the 
minimum of  exponentially distributed random 
variables, and thus will itself be exponentially distributed1, 
with mean   [7,8]. 
For simplicity, we will consider the case  the 
more general case is handled similarly. The total expected 
time to an alert, starting at the time the first member of the 
group becomes infected, is [10, 24] 
 
Using a standard approximation, (1.1) is approximately equal 
to 
 
Where C is the constant of integration. The latter quantity 
goes to C as . 
In other words, (1.1) remains bounded as . This is a 
very interesting result, since it says that the mean time to alert 
is bounded no matter how big our group size is [14, 15]. 
This is verified in our simulations. 
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION 
The Hierarchical Model simulation was implemented in Perl. 
The simulation was done on a network modeled as a tree with 
4 levels. Each level of the tree has 4 children. The simulation 
is started by randomly infecting a single leaf node. The rate of 
infection is fixed at the beginning of the simulation. The exact 
number of machines that each infected machine tries to infect 
is determined by using a Poisson distribution, with the mean 
value as the rate of infection. The worm scenarios were 
simulated with a large TTL value, 1000 [17, 21]. 
In each time slice, every infected machine tries to infect as 
many other machines as dictated by the Poisson distribution. 
Alerts are raised in the same time slice as an infection occurs. 
And each alert is propagated as high as possible in the 
hierarchy in the same time slice. 
In the case of false alarms, the rate of false alarms is fixed at 
the beginning of the simulation. Unlike worms where only 
infected machines can infect others, there is no relationship 
between one false alarm and the next. The machine that raises 
a false alarm is determined randomly [19, 21]. All false alarm 
scenarios were simulated with TTL window sizes varying 
from 10 to 400 time units. 
Simulations were run with thresholds at 75% and 50% of the 
number of children. That is, if 75% of a node's children have 
raised alerts, the node takes action. The structure of network 
and thresholds were chosen so as to be comprehensible. 
However, more complex structures with different number of 
children at each level and different thresholds at each level 
could also be simulated [24]. 
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
The basic results of two extreme cases where all parameters 
are identical except the rate of infection which is very high 
and very low are shown in Fig.1.2 and Fig.1.3. These two 
figures show that the number of infections before complete 
immunization could take place is almost the same for both the 
cases [22]. 
The simulation was done for different rates of infection with 2 
different levels of thresholds and the results are shown in 
Fig.1.4. As we can see in Fig.1.4, the number of infections 
before complete immunization takes place is almost the same 
for varied rates of infection. But the time it takes is different 
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and favorable too as seen in Fig.1.5. For high rates of 
infection, maximum possible protection is achieved quicker 
than for slower rates of spread [23]. This is a direct result of 
the dependence of the alert propagation on the infection rate. 
And we also see that the thresholds don't determine the time 
taken as it takes almost the same time to achieve complete 
immunization for 2 different threshold values. The only thing 
that varies with threshold is the number of infected machines 
[19, 20]. 
 
Thus the lessons learnt are [11, 13]: 
 For any rate of infection, the number of victims is the 
same. 
 
Figure 1.2: Response for a low rate of infection. # represents 
the number 
 
Figure 1.3: Response for a high rate of infection. # represents 
the number 
 
Figure 1.4: Percentage of machines infected for different rates 
of infection. 
 
Figure 1.5: The time taken for complete protection is 
inversely proportional to the infection rate. 
 The time taken for complete protection is inversely 
proportional to the infection rate. 
 It is only the threshold levels that makes or breaks the 
network. A low threshold helps to save a lot of 
machines. 
It is obvious that we can't forecast an unknown worm's 
infection rate. But we can define our tolerance. So, we now 
have a model which can tell us what should be the threshold, 
for a given tolerance. 
For example, if we want to save 90% of the Internet in the 
event of a worm attack, we need to find out from simulations 
what should be the thresholds at various levels of the network 
hierarchy and set the firewall rules accordingly. Setting the 
right thresholds at various levels of the hierarchy would 
achieve our goal of saving 90% of the Internet for us slowly or 
quickly, depending on the infection rate of the worm [21, 22, 
23]. 
4.1 False Alarms 
During false alarms the number of machines given protection 
does not rise steadily as in case of real worms. Rather, the 
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number of machines protected keeps oscillating as the 
systems backs off if there are no alerts within the TTL, as seen 
in Fig.1.6. This oscillation is an indication of a series of false 
alarms. It can also be considered as an indication of a Stealth 
Worm spreading very slowly. This is discussed in the next 
sub-section [1, 3]. 
Fig.1.7 shows the average number of machines that are given 
protection in response to false alarms for various TTLs and 
various false alarm rates. This protection involves a price and 
can be considered as a self inicted DoS attack [4, 5]. As we 
can see, if the TTLs are low enough, we pay a much lower 
price. But we would not be able to capture Stealth worms as is 
seen in figure 1.9. At the same time, a high TTL would raise 
false positives even for low rates of false alarms and raise 
costs unnecessarily. 
4.2 Stealth Worms 
We can see the same oscillating pattern in figure 1.8 and 
figure 1.9 which were recorded for a Stealth worm simulation 
with a TTL of 60. Figure 1.8 shows a case where the stealth 
worm is suppressed because of a low threshold of the defense 
system [16, 17]. 
 
Figure 1.6: The number of machines that are protected keeps 
oscillating in case of false alarms. # represents the number 
 
Figure 1.7: Average number of machine protected for 
different False Alarm rates for varying TTLs. 
 
Figure 1.8: A stealth worm overpowered with a low threshold. 
# represents the number 
 
 
Figure 1.9: A Stealth worm sneaking in due to a high 
threshold. 
 
Fig.1.9 shows a scenario where the protection mechanism is 
able to sense that something is wrong. But due to the high 
threshold, the rate of alerts received is just low enough that the 
TTL expires frequently and our system backs-off reasoning it 
as a false alarm. This suggests that we need a higher TTL or a 
lower threshold, which we addressed above. But a high TTL 
means a high cost due to false alarms which may be 
unacceptable [23, 24]. 
Since an oscillating curve means a series of false alarms or a 
stealth worm which is slow spreading, we can afford the 
luxury of human intervention. 
So, we need to arrive at a compromise saying that we will look 
out for Stealth worms which only spread above a certain 
speed. In any case, slower worms will get exposed as more 
and more machines are infected, as this will increase the 
overall rate of infection. So, the TTL also dictates how many 
machines we will have to sacrifice before our defense 
mechanism takes over. We may even lose all machines before 
we respond if we choose a very small TTL [16, 19]. 
                                                                              
International Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences (IJEAS) 
 ISSN: 2394-3661, Volume-2, Issue-4, April 2015   
                                                                                              59                                                                       www.ijeas.org 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This model uses a hierarchical relationship between 
co-operating hosts to mitigate the spread of a worm. Each leaf 
node is a vulnerable host and each non-leaf node is an 
invulnerable control structure which can process alerts sent by 
sensors at leaves and each non-leaf can issue appropriate 
instructions to its children. 
This paper also provided mathematical analyses of the 
hierarchical model of worm defense and showed that the time 
to alert the root of the hierarchy is bounded. 
From this model, and the simulations, we can determine the 
thresholds required at various levels of the hierarchy for a 
given tolerance of lost machines. We can also determine the 
TTL to stop a Stealth worm of a given speed by looking at the 
usual rate of false alarms in an environment. With the 
threshold levels and TTLs thus determined, we can effectively 
inhibit the spread of worms without losing much due to false 
alarms. 
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